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ABSTRACT 
	  
This research studies one specific financial instrument – Mortgage Servicing Rights 
(MSRs) and examines whether the fair value of MSRs based on managerial inputs (Level 
3) has financial reporting characteristics that differ from the fair value of MSRs based on 
market inputs (Level 2). Since fair value represents discounted future cash flows, we use 
future mortgage servicing fees as a proxy for future cash flows and measure whether the 
fair value of MSRs reflects the persistence of future servicing fees. We find that the fair 
value of MSRs based on managerial inputs (Level 3) better reflects the persistence of 
future servicing fees compared with the fair value of MSRs based on market inputs 
(Level 2). We also document that Level 3 fair values have a stronger association with 
proxies for default risk and prepayment risk. Consistent with conjectures made by Ryan 
(2008) and Laux and Leuz (2009), our results suggest that, although unobservable inputs 
are subject to managerial discretions, managers have the potential to generate higher 
quality fair value estimates than market inputs due to their information advantage, 
especially when the market for the underlying asset is inactive. 
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1. Introduction 
	  
Improving our understanding of the financial reporting characteristics of fair 
value measurements has long been an important issue for accounting standard setters, 
academics, and professionals.  Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 157 
“Fair Value Measurements” provides implementation guidance for the measurements of 
assets and liabilities at fair value through a hierarchical framework and proposes that “the 
fair value hierarchy gives the highest priority to quoted prices (unadjusted) in active 
market for identical assets or liabilities (Level 1) and the lowest priority to unobservable 
inputs (Level 3)”. However, if the market for the underlying asset is inactive, FAS 157 
allows managers to use their discretion and choose either to use models derived from 
managerial inputs (level 3) or market inputs (level 2) to value the assets and liabilities. 
Laux and Leuz (2009) note that the flexibility to use discretion in fair value accounting 
choices may be particularly relevant during periods of financial crisis. Ryan (2008) 
further contends that, 
“While Level 2 inputs generally are preferred to Level 3 inputs, FAS 157 does not 
necessarily require firms to use Level 2 inputs over Level 3 inputs. Firms should use the 
assumptions that market participants would use in pricing the asset or liability. When 
markets are illiquid, firms can make the argument that available Level 2 inputs are of 
such low quality that market participants would use Level 3 inputs instead.”1 
	  
Although managers may have an information advantage over an inactive market 
and incorporate private information through managerial input models, they also have 
incentives to impose biased model assumptions during the valuation process. In this 
paper, we examine whether fair values based on managerial inputs are more useful for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  In light of the financial crisis that began in 2007, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) released 
staff position papers FAS 157-3 and 157-4, recognizing that additional guidance is required for the adoption of 
fair value accounting during periods when a market is not active, or the transactions associated with an asset or 
liability are not orderly. Consistent with the conjectures in Ryan (2008), the FASB acknowledged that 
“multiple valuation techniques” might be the most appropriate way to determine fair values, and that the 
determination of prices and market conditions used to generate prices “depends on the facts and circumstances 
and requires the use of significant judgment.”	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decision making than fair values based on market inputs, particularly when the market 
for the underlying assets or liabilities is inactive. 
While most academic research2 and media attention focuses on aggregate values of 
assets and liabilities measures at fair value, managers make valuation and accounting 
decisions at the transaction/instrument level. Consequently, it is difficult to disentangle the 
impact of the aggregation of heterogeneous instruments when trying to reach conclusions 
about the decision usefulness of fair values using market inputs or managerial inputs. 
Additionally, decision usefulness is often operationalized as the market’s response to fair 
value measurements. Market responses to fair value measurements can be the result of the 
characteristics of the instrument, or the accounting and valuation choices made by 
management, which can also be difficult to isolate and identify. 
 To address our research question, we examine one specific financial instrument, 
Mortgage Servicing Rights (MSRs), and compare the financial reporting characteristics of 
MSRs classified as Level 2 assets with those of Level 3 assets. Mortgage servicing is the 
act of keeping a mortgage loan current, including collecting current and overdue 
payments, forwarding payments to the actual mortgage holder, and making any property 
tax and insurance payments related to the mortgaged property. Servicing may be 
performed by the originator of the mortgage, or the original lender may sell the right to 
service, an MSR, to another lender. The servicing activity is a source of income and cash 
flows for the service provider and the estimation of these future cash flows will ideally be 
reflected in the value of the MSR at the balance sheet date. Current accounting rules 
require that MSRs are initially measured at fair value and subsequently measured at either 
the lower of amortized cost or market, or fair value. While the size of the MSR market is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See section 2 for detailed literature review. 
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non-trivial (exceeding $60 billion in 2009), the market is not an active one, with very few 
trades each quarter. Because of the infrequent trading, virtually all MSR fair values are 
determined using a DCF model. Some models are derived using only market-observable 
inputs, while others incorporate manager’s private information and other unobservable 
data. Consequently, mortgage servicing rights are classified as either Level 2 or Level 3 
fair value assets under the SFAS 157 hierarchy. 
Based on the information provided in banks’ regulatory filings and their 10-Q and 10-
K reports from 2008 to 2011, we collect the fair value of the MSRs for 82 bank- holding 
companies (978 bank-quarters) and identify the servicing revenue generated each quarter 
from these MSRs.3 We start the sample period from 2008 because FAS 157 is effective for 
all fiscal periods beginning after November 15, 2007. Most of the bank-holding 
companies in our sample (62 out of 82 banks) always classify their mortgage servicing 
rights as Level 3 assets over the entire four-year period, indicating that these banks use 
managerial inputs to estimate the fair value of MSRs.  However, we also find that 20 
banks classify their MSRs as Level 2 assets for at least one quarter, indicating these banks 
contend to rely solely on market-observable inputs for MSR valuation4.  
Before comparing the quality of the Level 2 fair value with that of the Level 3 fair 
value, we first examine the determinants of Level 2 versus Level 3 classification for MSRs 
in a given quarter. We document that the choice to account for MSRs as Level 3 is 
positively associated with bank-level foreclosure activity of the servicing portfolios, and 
state-wide subprime lending activity. The Level 3 choice is also negatively associated with 
changes in state-level housing prices. Since banks, especially smaller regional banks, tend 
to service loans originated in the local market, these results suggest that banks that choose 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Although our sample is small, these 82 banks comprise over 85% of the U.S. market for mortgage servicing 
rights.	  
4	  Thirteen banks always classify their MSR assets as Level 2 for the entire four-year period.	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Level 3 fair value have riskier underlying mortgage servicing portfolios.5 We also find that 
Level 3 classification is more likely to be chosen by larger banks with Big Four auditors, 
and banks that choose to value their MSRs on an ongoing fair value basis. We do not find 
any association between lower accounting quality and the Level 2 versus Level 3 
classification choice. 
The fair value of the MSRs is calculated as the sum of the discounted expected 
future cash flows, where the majority of the future cash flows are based on a percentage 
of the outstanding principal balances. Thus, the most important risks associated with 
MSRs are mortgage defaults and prepayment/refinancing activity (Brown et al, 1992, Lin 
et al, 2006). Since both risk factors negatively affect the persistence of the underlying 
cash flows, we also use the persistence of the servicing fees as a summary measure of the 
riskiness of the underlying mortgage servicing rights. The prices of the mortgage 
servicing assets are usually quoted as a multiple of its contractual servicing revenue. 
Similar to other financial instruments, the valuation multiple is higher when the 
underlying assets are less risky. Thus, we test our research question by examining which 
MSR fair value (Level 2 or Level 3) better reflects the risk characteristics of the 
underlying servicing portfolio, which are proxied by the persistence of the servicing fees, 
the foreclosure risk of the servicing portfolio, and the state-level refinancing risk. Based 
on the results from our choice model, we control for significant differences between the 
Level 2 and Level 3 samples. Level 2 MSR banks are much smaller than Level 3 MSR 
banks, virtually all Level 2 MSR banks (except for one) value their MSR assets on a 
lower of cost or market basis and Level 2 banks appear to conduct business in areas with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Fifty-two percent of our sample firms disclose sources of changes in mortgage servicing rights during a 
given year. Based on the available disclosures, more than 95% of the servicing rights are derived from loans 
originated but subsequently sold with servicing rights retained. 
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a more stable housing market. Therefore, in addition to comparing the Level 2 MSR 
banks with the full sample of the Level 3 MSR banks, we also compare Level 2 MSR 
banks with Level 3 MSR banks that are of similar size, that use the lower of cost or 
market valuation option, and that are in areas with similar housing markets. Consistent 
with the results from the Probit model, we find the persistence of servicing fee revenues 
is higher for Level 2 MSRs than Level 3 MSRs on average. However, the difference in 
the servicing fee persistence is not significant after matching Level 2 banks with Level 3 
banks on the accounting choices, size, and regional housing-market conditions, 
suggesting the above factors successfully control for the riskiness of the servicing 
portfolios. 
Our main test results suggest that Level 3 fair values better reflect the risk 
characteristics of the underlying servicing portfolios. Specifically, we find that the MSR 
valuation multiple based on Level 3 fair value is positively associated with persistence of 
the servicing fees and negatively associated with proxies for default risk and prepayment 
risk. We do not find the valuation multiple based on Level 2 fair value reflects the risk 
characteristics of the underlying servicing portfolios. We also find that the above results 
hold for both recession and post-recession period. 
These results suggest that, when an asset is infrequently traded, fair values based on 
market inputs may not reflect the underlying cash flows. Instead, fair values based on 
managerial inputs incorporate firm-specific information more effectively, and better 
reflect the underlying economic characteristics of the assets/liabilities. We believe these 
findings are particularly relevant to the ongoing debate about the role of fair value 
accounting in financial reporting and valuation. A study of a particular asset class such as 
MSRs provides the benefit of examining a single type of asset rather than looking at an 
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aggregation of assets that may be subject to different valuation models or techniques. 
Unlike marketable securities which generate cash flows upon sale or the receipt of interest 
or dividends, the MSR is not a “passive” asset; the servicing is an activity performed by 
the banks which generates cash flows that are relatively more predictable than those 
related to other assets. Our findings suggest that the quality of the fair value inputs does 
differ across the levels of the hierarchy. However, contrary to some arguments contending 
that fair values based on managerial inputs are less informative and more biased than fair 
values based on market inputs, we provide evidence that there are instances where the 
unobserved Level 3 valuation inputs are more reflective of the economic attributes of the 
underlying assets than the observable Level 2 inputs, consistent with the conjectures in 
Ryan (2008). This distinction appears to be particularly relevant when investors have 
incomplete information about the economic attributes of the underlying assets or related 
assets. 
The remainder of this paper continues as follows; section 2 provides some 
background information about fair value accounting and mortgage servicing rights. 
Section 3 describes our sample and the research methods. We provide the results of our 
analyses in Section 4 and conclude in section 5. 
2.  Background and Research Question 
	  
2.1 Fair Value Accounting and SFAS 157 
	  
Much of the debate surrounding the use of fair values has been centered on the 
perceived reliability of these measures. Muller (1998) examines acquired brand names, 
measured at fair values, by U.K. firms and provides evidence that reliability may be 
compromised by managers trying to meet certain contracting incentives. Aboody et al 
(1998) examine the relationship between revaluations of fixed assets in the UK and 
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changes in future performance and conclude that a significant positive association is 
indicative of the reliability of the revaluation amounts. Following a suggestion by Sloan 
(1998) that “ex-post realizations […] should correspond more closely to the attributes 
being estimated,” Dietrich et al (2001) document that on average, fair value estimates are 
lower than actual selling prices, but are more accurate than historical costs for UK 
investment properties. They find evidence that managers will exert opportunistic 
discretion over reported fair value estimates, but that the reliability of these estimates is 
improved in the presence of external monitors. However, Cotter and Richardson (2002) 
document that in a sample of Australian asset revaluations, firms were more likely to 
engage the board of directors than an outside appraiser when investment and intangible 
assets were subject to revaluation, consistent with insiders having greater expertise 
related to firm-specific assets. They also did not document a difference in reliability for 
these types of assets between independent appraisers and internal appraisers. While these 
studies provide evidence that current values provided some information to the market, 
they also provide some evidence consistent with the concerns of those that oppose the use 
of fair values, mainly that they are more likely to be subjected to opportunistic choices by 
managers, especially when they are internally generated measures. 
In conjunction with the growing use of fair values in financial statements, the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board reexamined the fundamental characteristics of 
financial reporting. In Concept Statement 8 – The Conceptual Framework (CON8), the 
FASB contends that “If financial information is to be useful, it must be relevant and 
faithfully represents what it purports to represent.” CON 8 addresses the change from 
reliability to faithful representation by commenting on the different interpretations of 
reliability made by practitioners and financial statement users. Specifically, the Board 
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noted that “In particular, many respondents’ descriptions of reliability more closely 
resembled the Board’s notion of verifiability than its notion of reliability. The Board even 
allows for the possibility that financial information can still be a faithful representation 
even if the secondary quality of verifiability is not met.6 
	  
Even though the conceptual framework has changed to a requirement of faithful 
representation, the current standards that guide the reporting of fair values were written 
under the “reliability = verifiability” regime. In an effort to improve the transparency and 
comparability of assets and liabilities reported at fair value, the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board issued SFAS 157 - “Fair Value Measurements” effective for fiscal 
years beginning after November 15, 2007. The framework imposed by SFAS 157 
presents a hierarchy of fair value measurements that distinguishes between observable 
and unobservable inputs and assumptions about the value of an asset or liability, with the 
position that those fair values will become progressively less reliable/verifiable as inputs 
become less transparent to the market. Level 1 measurements are the most reliable and 
visible to financial statement users, as they are based on quoted prices from active, liquid 
markets for the same assets. Level 2 measurements are still considered to be marked-to- 
market prices or fair value models based on market inputs, but these markets are not 
perceived to be as reliable as Level 1 markets either due to market illiquidity or 
differences in the underlying assets because Level 2 pricing is based on observable 
prices in an active market for similar assets, or prices in an inactive market for identical 
assets. Finally, Level 3 measurements are based on unobservable inputs that reflect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  CON8 Paragraph BC3.10 - The Board does not agree that the distinction is arbitrary. Financial information without 
the two fundamental qualitative characteristics of relevance and faithful representation is not useful, and it cannot be 
made useful by being more comparable, verifiable, timely, or understandable. However, financial information that is 
relevant and faithfully represented may still be useful even if it does not have any of the enhancing qualitative 
characteristics. 
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managerial assumptions about the characteristics of a market for these assets or liabilities 
if such a market existed. These measurements are often referred to as marked-to-model, 
and require more extensive disclosures in the financial statements than Level 1 or Level 
2 prices. In this context, it appears that the SFAS 157 hierarchy system is based on 
verifiability, which indicates that managerial discretion may reduce the quality of Level 
3 fair values. 
Recognizing the potential weakness of Level 2 fair values, especially during the 
economic crisis, FAS 157 does allow managers to make the argument that available 
Level 2 inputs are of such low quality that Level 3 fair values are preferable if the 
market for the underlying assets is illiquid. As noted in Laux and Leuz (2009), FAS 
157-3 emphasizes that while managers may use models and unobservable inputs, they 
must incorporate the information contained in market prices, and also hold that illiquid 
markets may not be a sufficient reason to deviate from the use of market prices. As 
contended in Laux and Leuz (2010), “The fundamental difficulty here is that managers 
have an information advantage over auditors and regulators, which in turn makes it 
difficult to write and enforce accounting standards that both provide flexibility when it is 
needed and also constrain managers’ behavior where flexibility can be used 
opportunistically.” 
The majority of the academic research related to SFAS 157 has focused on the 
value relevance for stock prices of information reported in the hierarchical framework. In 
their review paper, Maines and Wahlen (2006) cite work by Barth (1991) and Choi 
(1997) regarding the relationship between post-retirement obligations and share prices. 
Maines and Wahlen (2006) then make inferences about investors’ reactions to the 
proposed SFAS 157 standard and suggest that investors are likely to decrease the weight 
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placed on “less reliable” Level 3 fair value measurements in their equity pricing 
decisions. Maines and Wahlen (2006) also suggest that future research should focus on 
how accounting value reflects the underlying cash flows as a potential measure of 
reliability. Riedl and Serafeim (2009) derive portfolios of assets based on their levels 
classifications and contend that Level 3 assets have higher implied betas and lead to 
larger bid-ask spreads relative to Level 1 and Level 2 assets, consistent with the argument 
that Level 3 induces a greater amount of information asymmetry. Goh et al (2009) 
examine investor reliance on the fair value estimates of assets reported by banks. The 
authors find lower pricing for marked-to-model assets than marked-to-market. Song et al 
(2010) document that the value relevance of Level 1 fair value net assets on stock prices 
is greater than the value relevance of Level 2 and Level 3 net assets, but the value 
relevance of these less reliable measures is greater for firms with stronger corporate 
governance. Kolev (2009) finds evidence that the mark to model estimates are generally 
less value relevant than those based on unadjusted market prices, with the gap more 
pronounced for firms with lower equity capital and fewer financial experts on the audit 
committee. Overall, these studies find evidence supporting the conjecture that the levels 
classification of fair value measurements has an impact on the equity valuation of the 
firm. Finally, Botosan et al (2011) examine the factors influencing banks’ tendency to use 
Level 3 inputs for their MBSNA available for sale securities and find both market 
liquidity and valuation resources affect the use of Level 3 inputs. Different from Botosan 
et al. (2001), this paper primarily focuses on whether L3 fair value better represents the 
economic characteristics of the underlying assets. 
2.2 Mortgage Servicing Rights 
	  
Mortgages are serviced when banks engage in activities that keep mortgage loans 
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current, including collecting payments of principal and interest, forwarding payments to 
the mortgage holder if the holder is not the servicer, and making all necessary tax and 
insurance payments on the mortgaged property. The right to service the mortgage may 
be retained by the original lender, or may be sold to another party. Consequently, the 
servicing right is an asset that can be valued separately from the related mortgage loan. 
Typically, for conventional servicing, the servicing fee is about 25 basis points of the 
balance of the underlying loan [Aldrich et al (2001)]7. An MSR asset is recognized if the 
benefit associated with servicing exceeds “adequate compensation,” defined as the 
amount needed to fairly compensate another servicer.8 The passage of SFAS 122 in 
1996 standardized the accounting treatment for both originated and purchased MSRs, 
requiring capitalization at origination/purchase, then amortization over the life of the 
loan. SFAS 140 applied the principle of lower of cost or market to MSRs, but the largest 
change to MSR accounting occurred with the passage of SFAS 156 “Accounting for 
Servicing of Financial Assets.” SFAS 156 provided a “fair value option” to banks with 
MSRs. Initial measurement of the MSR is at fair value, and subsequent measurement 
may continue at fair value, or at a lower of amortized cost or market. If fair value 
measurement is chosen for an MSR, the choice is irrevocable, however MSRs measured 
at lower of amortized cost or market can make a one-time election to use fair values. 
Banks that choose the fair value option for their MSRs disclose whether the MSRs are 
Level 2 or Level 3 “recurring” fair value assets on a quarterly basis.  Banks that choose 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Banks that intend to originate and service mortgages, but do not intend to hold the mortgage portfolio usually 
have the intention of selling their conforming loans (those under $417K) to Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae. 
Twenty-five basis points are the industry standard for conforming loan portfolios sold to Freddie/Fannie.	  
8	  “Adequate Compensation” is determined by the market level costs of servicing plus a normal profit margin. 
Since the majority of the servicing costs incurred are upfront investments in resources required to engage in the 
servicing activities, “Adequate Compensation” is often manifested in the form of fixed costs per loan. 
Therefore, servicing rights may generate a net liability when the outstanding principal balance drops to a 
certain level (usually $20,000 to $30,000). Banks only report a net asset or liability amount for all servicing 
portfolios in the regulatory report. In our sample, all banks report net MSR assets across all quarters. 
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the lower of cost or market for their MSRs disclose whether MSRs are Level 2 or Level 
3 “non-recurring” fair value assets on a quarterly basis. 
The use of fair values to measure MSRs is not without controversy. Emrick (2006) 
expressed concerns that SFAS 156 would decrease the usefulness of financial reports 
because reliability and comparability would be compromised as a result of the fair value 
measurements. However, they also noted that the fair value option provides symmetrical 
treatment for MSRs and hedges, reducing the volatility in earnings that occurs in hedge 
relationships that do not qualify for hedge accounting. SFAS 157 provided additional 
guidance for firms that were using fair values to determine the value of MSRs on their 
balance sheet. 
The market for MSRs is substantial (over $60 billion at the end of 2009) and 
highly concentrated, with the top ten servicers holding 60% of the market share 
(Urumoglu [2010]). However, trades within this market are very scarce. Based on the 
infrequent trading, MSRs are classified by mortgage servicers as either Level 2 or Level 
3 assets. Those that determine the MSR value with a Level 2 classification could (1) use 
a DCF model based on inputs observable to the market, or (2) value the assets based on 
the most recent trades in the MSR market or (3) mark to the interest-only strip receivable 
(IO) market as the underlying fundamentals of the MSR and the IO are very similar, 
meeting the conditions specified for an L2 classification.9 Seventy-five percent of Level 2 
banks in our sample disclose that they use a DCF model with observable inputs to value 
the MSRs. Observable inputs include projected prepayment rates and discount rates, 
which reflect the future cash flow uncertainty related to default and prepayment activities 
and a liquidity premium. Banks gather these market inputs from a variety of sources, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  The price of servicing is often express as a multiple of the servicing strip. For example, a 25 basis point strip 
of MSR’s priced at 100 basis points has a multiple of 4.	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including the Security Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), Mortgage 
Bankers Association, Bloomburg terminals for macro data, and Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac reports on delinquency rates. Banks that classify their MSRs as Level 3 assets also 
use a DCF model either developed internally or externally through a third-party valuation 
specialist. Different from Level 2 fair values, Level 3 fair values are based on managerial 
inputs that potentially reflect portfolio-specific information about prepayment and 
foreclosure rates, and changes in discount rates. As these inputs, as well as the underlying 
mortgages that generate the servicing rights, are not directly observable by the market, 
Level 3 classification is perceived by market participants to be less verifiable, consistent 
with the lower tier classification in the fair value hierarchy. 
There is very little research examining the accounting and valuation issues 
surrounding MSRs. Pfeiffer (1998) examines MSRs during the period when originated 
and purchased MSRs had different accounting treatment, and documents that even though 
originated MSRs were “off-balance sheet” and expensed as incurred, they were still 
priced by investors. Pfeiffer (1998) also found evidence that banks were engaging in 
MSR sales to record discretionary gains that would offset operating losses, providing 
managers with an opportunity to manage earnings. Aldrich et al (2001) examine the 
valuation methods and techniques associated with MSRs, relative to the IO market. They 
document that the spread between the IO market and the MSR market fluctuates 
substantially over their measurement period (1998-2000). They also document that the 
valuation of MSRs is significantly influenced by the precision of the prepayment model. 
However, it important to note that this study was completed before the passage of SFAS 
140 and 156. We believe that the recent changes in the accounting treatment for MSRs, 
the variation in the fair value accounting treatment (Level 2 versus Level 3), including 
the predominant use of DCF models by Level 2 versus management-influenced models 
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for Level 3, provide us with a setting to test the conjecture that certain economic factors 
(illiquid market, incomplete information) may lead to mark-to-model (Level 3) reports 
that are of higher quality than marked-to-market (Level 2) valuations. First, MSRs 
represent a single type of asset with characteristics that justify both Level 2 and Level 3 
fair value choices. Second, we can obtain information about the underlying revenue as a 
noisy proxy for the underlying cash flows generated by the MSR assets10. Finally, the 
	  
availability of both firm-level and macro-level data enables us to examine the relationship 
between valuations generated by Level 2 and Level 3 models and the associated risk 
factors. 
2.3 Research Question 
	  
We examine whether Level 3 fair values better reflect the economic characteristics of 
the underlying servicing portfolios than Level 2 fair values for mortgage servicing rights. 
If managers manipulate Level 3 fair values inputs to report biased numbers, then we 
expect to find that Level 3 fair values are less likely to reflect the actual risk factors of the 
servicing portfolios than Level 2 fair values. However, if Level 3 fair values based on 
managerial inputs better incorporate managers’ private information, we expect to find that 
Level 3 fair values better reflect the actual risk factors of the servicing portfolios than 
Level 2 fair values. 
	  
3.  Sample and Research Method 
	  
3.1 Sample 
	  
Our sample is drawn from the regulatory report (Y-9C) of bank holding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Revenues from servicing follow a “cash flow” process. The remittance agreement between the servicer 
and the mortgage acquirer determines the flow, as most agreement are based on actual payments from the 
homeowner to the servicer. Traditional agreements do not require the servicer to make upfront payments of 
interest and principal to the acquirer. 
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companies from 2008 to 2011. We start from 2008 because FAS 157 is effective for all 
fiscal periods beginning after November 15, 2007. Bank holding companies are required 
to report the fair value of mortgage servicing assets/liabilities on a quarterly basis in the 
regulatory reports. Banks classify mortgage servicing as net assets (liabilities) if the 
expected future revenue is higher (lower) than the adequate compensation. We first 
identify all banks with non-zero mortgage servicing assets/liabilities. We then read these 
banks’ 10-K and 10-Q reports filed with the SEC to identify whether banks report their 
mortgage servicing assets/liabilities as Level 2 or Level 3, and collect information 
disclosed by the banks about amortization costs, fair value adjustments, prepayment rates 
and discount rates. We also collect information about the amount of servicing revenue 
generated by the MSRs for each bank-quarter through the SEC filings. We identify 82 
unique bank holding companies, all of which report mortgage servicing rights as net 
assets. These 82 unique bank holding companies generate 978 bank-quarter observations 
for our full sample analyses. Of the unique 82 bank holding companies, 13 banks always 
classify their MSRs as L2 assets through the sample period. Four banks classify their 
MSRs as Level 2 assets first but change the classification during the four-year period to 
Level 3.  Three banks classify the MSRs as Level 3 assets first change the classification 
Level 2 subsequently. Overall, 20 unique banks classified their MSRs as Level 2 assets 
for at least one quarter during the sample period. The rest classify their MSRs as L3 
assets. Of the unique 20 banks that ever classified the MSRs as Level 2 assets, 15 
disclose that they value the MSR assets using a discounted future cash flow model with 
market inputs. Two banks disclose that they either use discounted future cash flows with 
market inputs or market quotes, whichever is more appropriate. The remaining three 
companies do not disclose the specific type of the market inputs. 
	   16	   	  
3.2 Research Design 
	  
We first use the following Probit model to investigate why some banks classify 
their MSRs as L2 assets while others classify their MSRs as L3 assets. 
LEVELi,t =α0 +α1FORE_RISKi,t +α2 REFI_RISKi,t +α3 SUBPRIMEi +α4 PROVi,t 
+α5 HPIi,t +α6 MKT_LIQ,t + α7 MSR/TAi,t + α8 SIZEi,t +α9 FVBVit 
+α10 AQ_RANKi,t   + α11 BIG4i,t + εi,t (1) 
	  
LEVEL equals 1 when MSRs are classified as Level 3 assets, and 0 when MSRs 
are classified as Level 2 assets. We include two sets of variables to model the 
classification choice. The first set includes variables that are related to the characteristics 
of the underlying servicing portfolios: FORE_RISK, REFI_RISK, SUBPRIME, PROV, 
and HPI. FORE_RISK is the percentage of the residential mortgage loans serviced for 
others that are in the process of foreclosure, measured for each bank quarter based on 
information provided in banks’ regulatory reports. In addition to default risk, prepayment 
risk is another important factor to consider in determining the fair value of the MSRs. 
Servicing portfolios with a higher level of prepayment rate are considered more risky 
because the contracted servicing fee for the mortgage servicing assets is a percentage of 
the outstanding principal balance. We cannot directly observe the expected prepayment 
rate of the servicing portfolio. However, the prepayment activity during our sample 
period is predominantly driven by refinancing activity due to the historically low 
mortgage rates. Therefore, we use the intensity of the refinancing activities in the state 
where a bank is headquartered to proxy for the prepayment risk.11 REFI_RISK is the 
percentage of refinancing loan amounts scaled by total loan amounts originated for each 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Based on the disclosed information, most of the MSR assets are derived from banks’ own loan originations 
where loans are subsequently sold with servicing rights retained. If banks tend to originate loans with local 
borrowers, then refinancing activity within a state where a bank locates would be correlated with the 
prepayment risk of the underlying servicing portfolios.	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state year.12 Subprime loans have higher default risk and are less likely to be refinanced. 
We obtain the number of subprime loans for each state at the end of 2007 from the 
Mortgage Bankers Association. We use the quintile raking of number of subprime loans 
(SUBPRIME) in a state where a bank is headquartered to proxy for the propensity of 
subprime mortgages contained in the bank’s servicing portfolios. We use PROV, 
calculated as the provision for loan and lease losses scaled by total interest income 
measured for each fiscal quarter, to capture the riskiness of the loan portfolios held by the 
bank on the balance sheet. If banks originate both the on balance sheet loan portfolios 
and the off balance sheet servicing portfolios, we expect the riskiness of the two 
portfolios might be correlated. Finally, we include the change in the housing price index 
(HPI) relative to December 2006 for the state where a bank is headquartered to proxy for 
the local real estate market conditions. 
After controlling for the risk characteristics of the underlying servicing portfolios, 
we include a second set of variables to explain to what extent the level classification is an 
accounting choice. We expect that banks are more likely to classify the MSR assets as 
Level 2 fair value assets when the MSR market is more liquid. We use the total trading 
volume in the bond market to capture the market wide liquidity, where MKT_LIQ is the 
monthly total trading volume of the bond market scaled by the total trading volume of the 
bond market in December 2007.13 MSR/TA is the fair value of the MSR at the end of the 
	  
fiscal quarter scaled by total assets, capturing the importance of the MSR valuation from 
the economic magnitude perspective. FVBV is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Information related to state level refinancing activity is acquired from Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council (FFIEC) website.	  
13	  There is no readily available measure for the liquidity of the MSR market. Since the revenue generated 
from the MSR assets is similar to an Interest Only strip receivable, we contend that the bond market 
liquidity is likely to be more relevant than the equity market liquidity. 
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bank adopts fair value reporting for its MSRs and 0 if a bank adopts lower of cost or 
market reporting for its MSRs. We use FVBV to capture the importance of the valuation 
of MSRs from a financial reporting perspective. As MSRs become more important, we 
expect that banks are more likely to report MSRs as Level 3 assets if concerns about 
market inputs outweigh the benefits of Level 2 reporting. We measure SIZE as the natural 
log of total assets. Since banks often hire an independent consulting company to value 
the MSRs, we expect larger banks are more likely to be able to bear the model valuation 
costs as explained in Emrick (2006) and therefore SIZE should be positively associated 
with LEVEL. One concern often expressed about fair value accounting that is marked to 
model is that it provides managers with opportunities to manipulate asset values and the 
related gains and losses, and potentially manage their earnings reports. We include 
AQ_RANK,  measured as the quintile rank of the estimated coefficient (β1) of the 
following regression CHARGEt+1 = β0  + β1 PROVISIONt + εt. This regression is 
estimated for firm i quarter t using the information of from quarter t-8 to t. As is in 
Altamuro and Beatty (2010), the relationship between the loan loss provision and next 
period charge-offs serves as a measure of loan-loss provision validity. If managers are 
choosing L3 classification to manage earnings, we would expect that choice to be 
associated with a less valid loan-loss provision. Finally, we include an indicator variable 
which equals 1 for banks with big four auditors and 0 otherwise. We do not have a signed 
prediction for this variable because, while big auditors may prefer a verifiable measure 
(level 2), they also have the resources and expertise to audit a more complex discounted 
cash flow model with managerial inputs. 
After investigating the determinants of the level classification, we use equation (2) 
to examine the persistence of the mortgage servicing fees to learn more about the 
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characteristics of the MSR assets, where Servicing Feei,t is the servicing revenue earned 
by bank i for quarter t. 14 
	  
Servicing Feei,t+1 = β0  + β1 Servicing Feei,t + β2 SIZEi,t + εi,t (2) 
	  
We use the estimated servicing fee persistence as a summary measure of the riskiness of 
the underlying servicing portfolios. A more persistent stream of serving revenue suggests 
that the MSR assets are less affected by foreclosures and prepayments, which represent 
less risk for the MSR assets. Since the variables measuring the risk characteristics of the 
underlying servicing portfolios are not perfect in equation (1), we use the estimated 
servicing fee persistence to corroborate the estimation results in the Probit model. If the 
results from the Probit model suggest that the servicing portfolios for Level 2 MSR is less 
(more) risky, we would expect the service fee generated by Level 2 MSRs to be more 
(less) persistent. 
We use the following two equations to examine whether the fair value 
measurements reflects the risk characteristics of the underlying MSR assets. 
MSRi,t = γ0  + γ1 Servicing Feei,t + γ2 SIZEi,t + γ3 Beta_Ranki + 
γ4 Beta_Ranki * Servicing Feei,t + εi,t (3) 
	  
MSRi,t = δ0  + δ1 Servicing Feei,t + δ2 SIZEi,t + δ3 REFI_RISKi,t  + δ4 FORE_RISKi,t 
+ δ5 REFI_RISKit * Servicing Feei,t  + δ6 FORE_RISKit * Servicing Feei,t  + εi,t (4) 
Where Beta_Rank is the quartile rank variable of the persistence of the net servicing fee 
estimated for each bank following equation (2).15 We use the rank variable to minimize 
the estimation noise. For a fair value measurement that represents the economic 
substance of the underlying mortgage assets, we expect to observe higher valuation 
multiples for less risky servicing portfolios. Specifically, we expect to find higher 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Buttimer and Lin (2005) explain that MSR servicers incur significant upfront costs building computing 
and customer-service infrastructure. The costs of servicing and the “adequate compensation” are mainly 
fixed. Therefore, expected future servicing revenue is the most important valuation factor.	  
15	  We require at least 8 quarterly observations to estimate bank-specific servicing fee persistence.	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valuation multiples for more persistent revenue streams (γ4 >0). We also expect to find 
lower valuation multiples for servicing portfolios with higher prepayment risk (δ5 <0) 
and higher default risk (δ6 <0). We estimate equations (3) and (4) for the Level 2 and 
Level 3 subsamples separately, and then test whether the estimated γ4, δ5, and δ6 
coefficients are different across the two samples.16 
	  
4.  Empirical Results 
	  
4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
	  
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics about our sample. We find that firms that 
classify their MSRs as Level 3 assets tend to hold riskier portfolios both on the balance 
sheet and off the balance sheet. For example, the average loan loss provision (PROV) for 
Level 3 banks is 24.89% compared with 15.02% for Level 2 banks, suggesting Level 3 
banks hold riskier loans on their balance sheet. We find 0.85% of residential loans 
serviced by Level 3 banks are in foreclosure, which is significantly higher than 0.14% 
serviced by Level 2 banks. In addition, Level 3 banks are located in states with a steeper 
drop in housing prices (lower HPI), a higher number of subprime mortgages right before 
the crisis period, and slightly lower refinancing activity. Since the majority of the 
servicing portfolios come from loans originated by the bank, especially for smaller banks, 
the above findings suggest that Level 3 servicing portfolios have a higher default risk on 
average if small banks are more likely to originate local loans. For variables that capture 
incentives for accounting choices, we find Level 3 banks have a larger amount of MSRs 
as a percentage of total assets and are more likely to adopt the fair value option for their 
MSRs, suggesting that the MSR valuation is more important for these banks. We find 
Level 3 banks are much larger (as measured by asset size) and are more likely to have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  For presentation and interpretation clarity, we run the regressions for the two subsamples separately. We 
obtain the same results if we estimate the regressions for the pooled sample with three-way interaction terms.	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one of the big four auditors, suggesting Level 3 banks have more resources to measure 
the fair value for sophisticated financial instruments. Finally, we find the accounting 
quality (measured by the ability of the loan loss provision to predict future write-offs) for 
Level 3 banks is higher than that for Level 2 banks. 
We provide Spearman rank correlations of our variables of interest in Table 2. 
Similar to the descriptive statistics presented in Table 1, we find the level choice is 
positively correlated with number of subprime loans (ρ=0.23), size (ρ=0.31) and choice 
 of the big four auditors (ρ=0.35) and negatively correlated with changes in housing price 
index (ρ=-0.18). We also find that larger banks report higher loan loss provisions, have 
more serving assets, are more likely to use fair value option for their servicing assets, and 
serve more loans that are in the process of foreclosure. We find the correlations between 
changes in the housing price index and number of subprime loans (ρ=-0.30) and loan loss 
provisions (ρ=-0.21) to be significantly negative, suggesting loans originated in states 
with steeper housing price drops have higher credit risk. We find the correlation between 
HPI and REFI_RISK to be significantly negative, suggesting states with steeper housing 
price drops also have more refinancing activity. Finally, we find that the indicator 
variable for fair value adoption is significantly positively correlated with the probability 
of the Level 3 classification and choice of big four auditors. 
4.2 Determinants of Level 2 versus Level 3 classification 
	  
In Table 3, we report the regression results for the Probit model examining the 
determinants of fair value classification choice. Our findings suggest that the levels 
classification is affected by both the characteristics of the underlying servicing portfolios 
and managerial choices. Consistent with the descriptive statistics reported in Table 1, the 
servicing portfolios for mortgage servicing rights classified as Level 3 assets have higher 
	   22	   	  
default risk. The estimated coefficient for FORE_RISK is significantly positive at the 1% 
level. The estimated coefficient is significantly negative for HPI and positive for 
SUBPRIME, suggesting Level 3 banks are more likely to be located in the states with 
steeper drops in housing price and a higher number of subprime loans. The estimated 
coefficient for REFI_RISK is negative but not significantly different from zero. In sum, if 
banks are more likely to originate loans in their local market, the above findings suggest 
that the servicing portfolios for Level 3 banks have higher credit risk than that for Level 2 
banks, but not higher prepayment risk caused by refinancing. In addition to the 
characteristics of the underlying service portfolio, we find smaller banks are more likely 
to use market inputs to value the MSR assets, consistent with the argument that hiring an 
external independent valuation agency or developing internal models is too costly for 
smaller banks. We also find that banks that have more MSR assets and choose the fair 
value option for MSRs are more likely to choose Level 3 classification, consistent with 
the argument that banks choose to use firm-specific inputs when MSRs are more 
important either from an economic magnitude perspective or for financial reporting 
purposes. We do not find evidence consistent with an association between lower 
accounting quality and the Level 2 versus Level 3 classification choice. Finally, after 
controlling for size, we still find firms with big four auditors are more likely to use firm-
specific model inputs and classify the MSR fair value as level 3. 
4.3 Persistence of servicing fees for Level 2 and Level 3 MSRs 
	  
We use the persistence of servicing fees associated with the MSR assets as a 
summary measure of the underlying riskiness of the servicing portfolio and report the 
regression results in Table 4. Column (1) reports regression results for equation (2) for 
the full sample. Since regression results from Table 3 suggest that both bank 
	   23	   	  
characteristics and the risk characteristics of the underlying servicing portfolios affect the 
fair value level classification, we also match Level 2 banks with Level 3 banks on 
dimensions such as fair value option choice, geographic location, and size and report 
regression results in column (2), (3), and (4). For the full sample, we find that servicing 
fees generated by Level 2 MSRs are highly persistent. For example, the estimated 
coefficient of β1 is 0.6482 for Level 2 MSRs, significantly higher than zero (p-value = 
0.0001).  We find the estimated coefficient for the interaction term LEVEL* Servicing 
fee to be -0.2776 but not statistically significant (p-value = 0.1235), suggesting the cash 
flow persistency for Level 3 MSRs is not statistically different from that for the Level 2 
MSRs. 
To control for the accounting choice between fair value option and the lower of 
cost or market option, we restrict the regression analysis to the sub-sample that only 
adopt lower of cost or market valuation option and report the results in Table 4 column 
(2). The estimated coefficient for the interaction term LEVEL * Servicing fee is 
significantly negative with a p-value of 0.0789, suggesting significantly lower persistence 
for servicing fee revenue for MSRs reported as Level 3 assets. To further control for the 
risk characteristics of the underlying service portfolios caused by geographic locations, 
we further restrict the regression analysis to include only Level 3 banks located in the 
same states as the Level 2 banks and still find that cash flows for Level 3 MSRs are less 
persistent than cash flows for Level 2 MSRs. The above results are consistent with the 
Probit model regression results reported in Table 3 and suggest that Level 2 MSRs are, on 
average, less risky than Level 3 MSRs. Finally, we match each Level 2 bank with a Level 
3 bank on the lower of costs or market valuation option, changes in state level housing 
price index, and size. Results reported in column (4) suggest that after matching on the 
	   24	   	  
above three dimensions, the difference of cash flow persistency between Level 2 MSRs 
and Level 3 MSRs is not significantly different. Therefore, we believe the risk 
characteristics of the underlying servicing portfolios for Level 2 MSRs and Level 3 
MSRs are similar after matching on the above three dimensions. 
4.4 Comparison between Level 2 and Level 3 MSR fair values 
We report our first set of main tests in Table 5, where we examine which fair 
value for MSRs better reflect the persistence of the underlying cash flow process. If the 
MSR asset value represents the economic substance of the underlying cash flow process, 
we expect the valuation multiple to be positively associated with the persistence of the 
cash flows (γ4>0). That is, we expect a higher valuation multiple for less risky cash 
flows.  Table 5 Column (1) show that we do not find this relationship for fair values of 
MSRs classified as Level 2 assets. The estimated coefficient of γ4 in column (1) is 
negative 0.0976 (p-value = 0.8557). For fair value of MSRs based on managerial inputs 
(Level 3), we find γ4 to be significantly positive for all four samples. For example, the γ4 
estimate for Level 3 fair value for all banks is 1.4980 as reported in Column (2), 
significantly higher than zero (p-value = 0.0532). For banks that classify their MSRs as 
Level 3 assets and also adopt lower of cost or market valuation option for MSRs reported 
in Column (3), the estimated coefficient of γ4 is 1.4648  (p-value = 0.0636). For banks 
that classified their MSRs as Level 3 assets, adopt lower of cost or market valuation 
options, and locate in the same state as banks reporting Level 2 MSRs, the estimated 
coefficient of γ4 is 1.5958  (p-value = 0.0009). Finally, for banks that classified their 
MSRs as Level 3 assets, adopt lower of cost or market valuation options, have similar 
size as Level 2 banks, and experience similar housing market conditions during the 
sample period, the estimated coefficient of γ4 is 1.5212 (p-value = 0.0199). In sum, our 
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results suggest that the valuation multiple of fair value measurements based on 
managerial inputs (Level 3) is significantly positively associated with the cash flow 
persistence, whereas we do not find this positive association for fair values based on 
market inputs (Level 2).17 We also show that the difference between the two samples are 
not driven by the difference in the underlying service portfolios because Table (4) 
Column (4) shows that the persistence of servicing fee is the same across the two 
samples after matching on lower of costs or market valuation choice, HPI, and size. We 
contend that this finding provides direct evidence of the conjectures made in Ryan 
(2008), that certain unobservable managerial inputs may be of higher quality and more 
useful that observable market inputs. 
As a supplemental analysis, we consider the impact of disclosures on the financial 
characteristics of MSR reporting. In Table 5, Panel B, we find that only banks that 
disclose prepayment and discount rate assumptions in their annual report generate MSR 
fair value measurements that are statistically positively associated with the persistence of 
cash flows. The result is consistent with the argument that banks that choose more 
transparent financial reporting through additional disclosures tend to generate more 
reliable fair value measures based on managerial inputs. 
We report our second set of main tests in Table 6, where we examine which fair 
value for MSRs better reflect the prepayment risk and default risk of the underlying 
service portfolios. We use the state-level refinancing activity to capture the prepayment 
risk (REFI_RISK). We use percentage of loans serviced in foreclosure to capture default 
risk (FORE_RISK). If the MSR fair value measurement reflects the risk characteristics, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  We obtain the same results if we combine the two subsamples and run pooled regressions with three-way 
interactions. Moreover, we find that the three-way interaction term is significantly positive, suggesting Level 3 
fair value is statistically more sensitive to the risk characteristics of the underlying service  portfolios than 
Level 2 fair value.	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we expect to find both δ5 and δ6 to be significantly negative in equation (4). Table 6, 
Column (1) documents that for Level 2 banks, the estimated coefficient is -2.0351 (p-
value = 0.6384) for REFI_RISK and -30.69 (p-value = 0.5028) for FORE_RISK. Neither 
is significantly different from zero. In contrast, the coefficient estimates for REFI_RISK 
and FORE_RISK are significantly negative for Level 3 fair values across all 
specifications. For example, Column (5) reports that the estimated coefficient for 
REFI_RISK is negative 10.04 (p-value = 0.0325), suggesting that increase in one 
standard deviation of the prepayment risk proxied by state-level refinancing activity 
reduces the valuation multiple by 0.72. Column (5) also reports that the estimated 
coefficient for FORE_RISK is negative 104.51 (p-value = 0.0158), suggesting that an 
increase in one standard deviation of the default risk proxied by percentage of loans 
serviced in foreclosure reduces the valuation multiple by 0.84. Overall, the results 
reported in Table 6 Panel A are consistent with the results reported in Table 5 Panel A 
and suggest that fair value based on managerial inputs better reflects the risk 
characteristics of the underlying servicing portfolios. 
Table 6 Panel B reports the regression results of equation (4) partitioning the 
Level 3 banks based on whether they disclose prepayment rates and discount rates in the 
annual reports filed to the SEC. We find results consistent with the argument that banks 
that disclosure the firm-specific modeling inputs generate better fair value measurements. 
4.5 Robustness Tests 
	  
Our sample period consists of both a recession period 2008-2009 and a post- 
recession period 2010-2011. Since both the MSR market liquidity and the incentives to 
provide informative managerial estimates might be different across the two periods, we 
also examine our research question and conduct the main tests for the two periods 
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separately. We find that, on average, both the servicing fee persistency and the MSR 
valuation multiple increases from the recession period to the post-recession period, 
consistent with the observation that the servicing portfolio experiences lower default risk 
and refinancing risk in the post-recession period. However, our results that Level 3 fair 
value better reflects the risk characteristics hold for both periods. 
In our main tests, we only match Level 3 banks with Level 2 banks on the most 
important dimensions indicated by our determinants model, such as size, geographic 
location, and adoption of the fair value accounting option. As a robustness check, we also 
match Level 3 banks with Level 2 banks on alternative firm characteristics such as 
whether a bank engages a big four auditor. Our results do not change based on this 
specification. However, the small sample size limits our matching process to at most 
three factors and it is impractical to conduct propensity score matching based on all 
available information. 
Finally, we explore the sensitivity of our REFI_RISK variable. Rather than 
measure only in the state where the corporate headquarters are located, we also measure 
REFI_RISK as a weighted-average of the state-level refinancing rates where the bank has 
operating activity, proxied by the percentage of branch deposits in that particular state. 
We find 30 banks in our sample operate only in home states. Thirty-one banks operate 
between two and five states with 79% of business conducted in the home states where 
they have their headquarters. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that refinancing activity 
in the headquarters’ states would capture the relevant refinancing activity. In addition, the 
correlation between our original REFI_RISK variable measure and this modified 
REFI_RISK measure is 0.93. We obtain very similar results based on the modified 
refinancing risk measure. 
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5 Conclusions 
	  
In this paper, we collect a sample of banks that have mortgage servicing rights 
subject to Level 2 and Level 3 classification in accordance with the SFAS 157 fair 
value hierarchy. We examine the financial reporting characteristics of these fair value 
assets, and whether those characteristics differ across the classification levels. We first 
examine the determinants of the levels classification, and find evidence that bank size, 
accounting choice and mortgage risk attributes are associated with the levels 
classification decision. Through an examination of the persistence of servicing fees and 
the association between the MSR valuation multiple and underlying mortgage risk 
factors, we provide evidence that during periods of infrequent trading and market 
illiquidity, valuations from models that reflect management’s input and expertise 
provide an MSR asset value that is more closely associated with the underlying cash 
flows. This finding is consistent with conjectures made by Ryan (2008) that a well-
developed model may provide more useful information to investors than reliance on 
weaker market inputs. 
Additionally, we contend that our study makes a contribution to the literature 
by thinking about valuation and accounting choices in a way that is similar to the 
approach taken by managers, at the transaction level. By focusing on one particular type 
of asset with a discernible cash flow process, we are able to incorporate variables that 
are directly related to the risks and rewards associated with mortgage servicing rights. 
Consequently, we are not making inferences based on an aggregation of heterogeneous 
risks and processes. By narrowing our focus, we believe that a greater understanding of 
the managerial decision-making process with respect to fair value accounting can be 
realized, and that the results of this study will be particularly relevant to the ongoing 
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debate about the role of fair values in financial reporting, and what financial reporting 
characteristics are necessary to generate decision-useful financial information. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
	  
	   Level 2 
(Mean) 
Level 2 
(Median) 
Level 3 
(Mean) 
Level 3 
(Median) 
Difference 
in Means 
Difference 
in Medians 
FORE_RISK 0.0014 0 0.0085 0.0018 *** *** 
HPI -0.0745 -0.0549 -0.1134 -0.0895 *** *** 
REFI_RISK 0.5989 0.5969 0.5845 0.5815 * * 
SUBPRIME 1.4098 1 2.1808 2 *** *** 
PROV 0.1502 0.1255 0.2489 0.1669 *** ** 
MKT_LIQ 1.6235 1.6694 1.6507 1.7502 	   	  
SIZE 7.7015 7.7503 9.2110 9.0087 *** *** 
MSR/TA 0.0017 0.0014 0.0024 0.0015 *** 	  
FVBV 0.0245 0 0.4362 0 *** *** 
AQ 1.7395 1 2.1265 2 *** *** 
BIG4 0.2418 0 0.6619 1 *** *** 
N 192 192 786 786 	   	  
	  
	  
***, **, *  indicate significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
	  
Variable definitions: 
FORE_RISK  is the percentage of the residential mortgage serviced for others that are in process of 
foreclosure, measured for each bank quarter. HPI  is the change in housing price index relative to December 
2006 measured for each state quarter. REFI_RISK  is the percentage of refinancing loan amounts scaled 
by total loan amounts, measured for each state year. SUBPRIME  is the quintile rank of the number of  
subprime mortgages at the end of 2007, measured for each state. PROV  is the provision for loan and lease 
losses scaled by total interest income measured for each bank quarter. MKT_LIQ  is the total trading   
volume of the bond market scaled by the total trading volume of the bond market in December 2007, 
measured for each month. SIZE  is the natural log of beginning total assets, measured for each bank quarter. 
MSR/TA  is the fair value of the mortgage servicing right at the end of the fiscal quarter scaled by total 
assets. FVBV  is an indicator variable that equals one if a company chooses the fair value reporting option 
for its MSRs. AQ  is the quintile rank of the estimated coefficient (β1) of the following regression 
CHARGEt+1 =β0 +β1PROVISIONt+εt. This regression is estimated for firm i quarter t using the  
information from quarter t-8 to t. BIG4  is an indicator variable equal to 1 for banks that use big 4 auditors 
and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 2: Correlations of main variables. 
	  
	   (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
LEVEL (1) 0.21 0.05 -0.18 0.23 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.31 0.35 0.12 0.35 
FORE_RISK (2) 1.00 -0.08 -0.20 0.10 0.21 0.09 0.26 0.47 0.19 0.12 0.29 
REFI_RISK (3) 	   1.00 -0.21 -0.08 0.18 0.15 -0.19 -0.21 -0.15 0.02 -0.22 
HPI (4) 	   	   1.00 -0.30 -0.21 -0.24 0.00 -0.06 -0.13 -0.06 0.07 
SUBPRIME (5) 	   	   	   1.00 0.13 -0.01 -0.02 0.12 0.06 0.16 0.10 
PROV (6) 	   	   	   	   1.00 0.18 0.19 0.32 0.26 0.20 0.10 
MKT_LIQ (7) 	   	   	   	   	   1.00 0.09 0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.00 
MSR/TA (8) 	   	   	   	   	   	   1.00 0.32 0.39 0.03 0.17 
SIZE (9) 	   	   	   	   	   	   	   1.00 0.50 0.19 0.65 
FVBV (10) 	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   1.00 0.09 0.31 
AQ (11) 	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   1.00 0.14 
BIG4 (12) 	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   1.00 
	  
Numbers in bold indicates 1% level of significance. 
	  
Variable definitions: 
LEVEL  is an indicator variable that equals 1 for bank-quarters reporting MSRs as level 3 assets and 0 for 
bank-quarters reporting MSRs as level 2 assets. FORE_RISK  is the percentage of the residential mortgage 
serviced for others that are in process of foreclosure, measured for each bank quarter. REFI_RISK  is the 
percentage of refinancing loan amounts scaled by total loan amounts, measured for each state year. HPI  is 
the changes in housing price index relative to December 2006 measured for each state quarter. 
SUBPRIME  is the natural log of number of subprime mortgages at the end of 2007, measured for each 
state. PROV  is the provision for loan and lease losses scaled by total interest income measured for each 
bank quarter. MKT_LIQ  is the total trading volume of the bond market scaled by the total trading volume 
of the bond market at the end of 2007, measured for each month. MSR/TA  is the fair value of the mortgage 
servicing right at the end of the fiscal quarter scaled by total assets, measured for each bank quarter. SIZE 
is the natural log of beginning total assets, measured for each bank quarter. FVBV  is an indicator variable 
that equals one if a company chooses the fair value reporting option for its MSRs. AQ  is the quintile rank of 
the estimated coefficient (β1) of the following regression CHARGEt+1 =β0 +β1PROVISIONt+εt. This 
regression is estimated for firm i quarter t using the information from quarter t-8 to t. BIG4  is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 for banks that use big 4 auditors and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 3: PROBIT Model regression results for Level 2 versus Level 3 classification. 
	  
LEVELi,t =α0 +α1FORE_RISKi,t +α2 REFI_RISKi,t +α3 SUBPRIMEi +α4 PROVi,t 
+α5 HPIi,t +α6 MKT_LIQ,t + α7 MSR/TAi,t + α8 SIZEi,t +α9 FVBVit 
+ α10 AQ_RANKi,t   + α11 BIG4i,t + εi,t (1) 
	  
	  
	  
	   Estimated 
Coefficients 
P-value 
	  
Proxy for the riskiness of the underlying servicing portfolios 
FORE_RISK 0.0771 (0.0018)*** 
REFI_RISK -0.2532 (0.1264) 
HPI -0.3027 (0.0154)** 
SUBPRIME 0.0488 (0.0001)*** 
PROV -0.0192 (0.6517) 
	  
Determinants of the accounting choice 
MKT_LIQ 0.0708 (0.2606) 
MSR/TA 18.387 (0.0011)*** 
SIZE 0.1723 (0.0425)** 
FVBV 0.2473 (0.0001)*** 
AQ 0.0049 (0.5449) 
BIG4 0.1999 (0.0001)*** 
Intercept 0.5994 (0.0001)*** 
N 978 	  
Pseudo R2 32.61% 	  
	  
***, **, *  indicates significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Two-tailed p-values are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. 
	  
Variable definitions: 
LEVEL  is an indicator variable that equals 1 for bank-quarters reporting MSRs as level 3 assets and 0 for 
bank-quarters reporting MSRs as level 2 assets. FORE_RISK  is the percentage of residential mortgage 
serviced for others that are in process of foreclosure, measured for each bank quarter. REFI_RISK  is the 
percentage of refinancing loan amounts scaled by total loan amounts, measured for each state year. 
SUBPRIME  is the quintile rank of the number of subprime mortgages at the end of 2007, measured for  
each state. PROV  is the provision for loan and lease losses scaled by total interest income measured for  
each bank quarter. HPI  is the changes in housing price index relative to December 2006 measured for each 
state quarter. MKT_LIQ  is the total trading volume of the bond market scaled by the total trading volume   
of the bond market at the end of 2007, measured for each month. MSR/TA  is the fair value of the mortgage 
servicing right at the end of the fiscal quarter scaled by total assets, measured for each bank quarter. SIZE 
is the natural log of beginning total assets, measured for each bank quarter. FVBV  is an indicator variable 
that equals one if a company chooses the fair value reporting option for its MSRs. AQ  is the quintile rank of 
the estimated coefficient (β1) of the following regression CHARGEt+1 = β0  + β1 PROVISIONt + εt . This 
regression is estimated for firm i quarter t using the information from quarter t-8 to t. BIG4  is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 for banks that use big 4 auditors and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 4:  Persistence of servicing fees 
	  
Servicing Feei,t+1 = β0  + β1 Servicing Feei,t + β2 SIZEi,t + β3 LEVELi,t 
+β4 LEVELi,t *Servicing Feei,t  + εi,t (2) 
	  
	  
	   Full Sample 
	  
	  
	  
	  
(1) 
L3 
matched 
with L2 on 
LCM 
	  
(2) 
L3 matched 
with L2 on 
LCM & 
Geography 
	  
(3) 
L3 matched with 
L2 on LCM, HPI 
& Size 
	  
(4) 
Intercept 0.0004 0.0004 0.0006 0.0004 
(0.0410) ** (0.0438) ** (0.0510)* (0.0012)*** 
Servicing Fee 0.6482 0.6884 0.6610 0.6484 
(0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** 
Size 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0000 
(0.0895)* (0.1854) (0.1232) (0.5644) 
Level -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0001 
(0.0063)*** (0.0350)** (0.0723)* (0.5301) 
Level * -0.2776 -0.2705 -0.2317 -0.0714 
Servicing Fee (0.1235) (0.0789)* (0.0766)* (0.5720) 
R2 24.00% 13.55% 15.97% 29.45% 
N 978 660 422 382 
	  
Notes: Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients for equation (2). Column (1) reports regression results for 
the full sample. Column (2) reports regression results based on subsample of L2 and L3 banks that adopt 
lower of costs or market reporting for their MSR assets. Column (3) reports regression results matching L2 
banks with L3 banks on the lower of costs or market accounting choice and the geographic locations. 
Column (4) reports regression results matching L2 banks with L3 banks on the lower of costs or market 
accounting choice, the state-level house price index, and size. 
	  
***, **, * indicates significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Two-tailed p-values are reported in 
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at bank level. 
	  
Variable definitions: 
Servicing Fee is the servicing revenue generated from the MSR assets scaled by the beginning total 
assets.  Size  is the natural log of beginning total assets. Level  equals 1 for level 3 MSRs and 0 for level 2 
MSRs. 
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   L2 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
(1) 
L3 Full 
Sample 
	  
	  
	  
	  
(2) 
L3 matched 
with L2 on 
LCM 
	  
	  
	  
(3) 
L3 matched 
with L2 on 
LCM & 
Geography 
	  
(4) 
L3 matched 
with L2 on 
LCM, HPI & 
Size 
	  
(5) 
Intercept 0.0013 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0019 -0.0026 
(0.4121) (0.5698) (0.7312) (0.4333) (0.1192) 
Servicing Fee 3.5590 1.2450 1.6600 1.1716 1.4723 
(0.0001)*** (0.0956)* (0.0001)*** (0.1598) (0.1740) 
Size 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0005 0.0002 
(0.6064) (0.3215) (0.2527) (0.1795) (0.1653) 
Beta_Rank -0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0002 
(0.1541) (0.0956)* (0.1143) (0.5878) (0.2514) 
Beta_Rank * -0.0976 1.4980 1.4648 1.5958 1.5212 
Servicing Fee (0.8557) (0.0532)* (0.0636)* (0.0009)*** (0.0199)** 
	  
R2 
	  
26.06% 
	  
31.10% 
	  
30.07% 
	  
33.0% 
	  
25.67% 
	  
N 
	  
192 
	  
786 
	  
472 
	  
254 
	  
190 
	  
Table 5: Association between the valuation multiples of the servicing fee with the 
persistence of servicing fee 
	  
MSR i,t = γ0  + γ1 Servicing Feei,t + γ2 SIZEi,t + γ3 Beta_Ranki 
+ γ4 Beta_Ranki * Servicing Feei,t + εi,t (3) 
Panel A – Comparison between Level 2 and Level 3 MSR prices 
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Panel B: Association of the valuation multiple of the servicing fee with the persistence of 
servicing fee for L3 MSRs, split into disclosure and non-disclosure groups based on 
whether the bank provides information about prepayment assumptions and discount rates 
in their annual filings. 
	  
	   L3 with 
disclosure 
L3 without 
disclosure 
Intercept 0.0004 -0.0017 
(0.6381) (0.0001)*** 
Servicing Fee 0.8432 1.8715 
(0.1532) (0.0001)*** 
Size 0.0001 0.0002 
(0.2156) (0.1056) 
Beta_Rank 0.0005 0.0004 
(0.0510)* (0.1233) 
Beta_Rank * 1.6074 0.7764 
Servicing Fee (0.0001)*** (0.2152) 
	  
R2 
	  
42.28% 
	  
38.56% 
	  
N 
	  
500 
	  
286 
	  
	  
	  
Notes: Table 5 reports the estimated coefficients for equation (3). Panel A Column (1) reports regression 
results for the level 2 banks. Panel A Column (2) reports regression results for all level 3 banks. Panel A 
Column (3) reports results for the subsample of level 3 banks that adopt lower of costs or market reporting 
for their MSR assets. Panel A Column (4) reports regression results for the subsample of level 3 banks that 
are matched with level 2 banks on the lower of costs or market accounting choice and geographic location. 
Panel A Column (5) reports regression results for the subsample of level 3 banks that are matched with 
level 2 banks on the lower of costs or market accounting choice, the state-level house price index, and size. 
	  
***, **, * indicate significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Two-tailed p-values are reported in 
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. 
	  
MSR  is the fair value of mortgage servicing right scaled by the beginning balance of total assets. 
Servicing Fee  is the servicing fee generated from the servicing assets scaled by beginning total assets. 
Size  is the natural log of total assets. Beta_Rank  is the quartile rank variable of the persistence of the 
servicing fee estimated for each bank following equation (2). 
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   L2 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
(1) 
L3 full 
sample 
	  
	  
	  
	  
(2) 
L3 matched 
with L2 on 
LCM 
	  
	  
	  
(3) 
L3 matched 
with L2 on 
LCM & 
Geography 
	  
(4) 
L3 matched 
with L2 on 
LCM, HPI & 
Size 
	  
(5) 
Intercept 0.0033 -0.0007 0.0009 0.0039 0.0035 
(0.1499) (0.5632) (0.3690) (0.0441)** (0.0047)*** 
Servicing Fee 4.3538 7.9985 8.6919 7.7146 10.072 
(0.0001)*** (0.0001) *** (0.0004)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0018)*** 
Size -0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 
(0.7466) (0.2412) (0.2100) (0.7813) (0.8417) 
REFI_RISK -0.0034 -0.0050 -0.0035 -0.0061 -0.0050 
(0.2889) (0.1329) (0.2050) (0.0912)* (0.1211) 
FORE_RISK -0.0049 0.0144 0.0106 0.0272 0.0212 
(0.5536) (0.3348) (0.4236) (0.1025) (0.2516) 
REFI_RISK * -2.0351 -11.65 -13.57 -9.01 -10.34 
Servicing Fee (0.6384) (0.0245)** (0.0289)** (0.0415)** (0.0325) ** 
FORE_RISK * -30.69 -91.58 -75.09 -100.81 -104.51 
Servicing Fee (0.5028) (0.0365)** (0.0966)* (0.0235)** (0.0158)** 
	  
R2 
	  
22.93% 
	  
35.55% 
	  
34.72% 
	  
37.95% 
	  
36.04% 
	  
N 
	  
192 
	  
786 
	  
472 
	  
254 
	  
190 
	  
Table 6: Association between the valuation multiples of the servicing fee with the 
refinancing risk and foreclosure risk 
	  
MSRi,t = δ0  + δ1 Servicing Feei,t + δ2 SIZEi,t + δ3 REFI_RISKi,t  + δ4 FORE_RISKi,t 
+ δ5 REFI_RISKit * Servicing Feei,t  + δ6 FORE_RISKit * Servicing Feei,t  + εi,t (4) 
Panel A – Comparison between Level 2 and Level 3 MSR prices 
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Panel B: Comparison between Level 3 MSR prices with disclosures and Level 3 MSR 
prices without disclosures 
	  
	  
	  
	   L3 with 
disclosure 
L3 without 
disclosure 
Intercept -0.0035 0.0018 
(0.0085)*** (0.0368)** 
Servicing Fee 10.561 5.5891 
(0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** 
Size 0.0002 0.0001 
(0.1989) (0.5234) 
REFI_RISK -0.0058 -0.0024 
(0.0985) * (0.3654) 
FORE_RISK 0.0235 -0.0125 
(0.2254) (0.5698) 
REFI_RISK * -15.69 -4.489 
Servicing Fee (0.0289) ** (0.6184) 
FORE_RISK * -110.09 -40.25 
Servicing Fee (0.0001)*** (0.3702) 
	  
R2 
	  
40.55% 
	  
32.51% 
	  
N 
	  
500 
	  
286 
	  
	  
Notes: Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients for equation (4). Panel A Column (1) reports regression 
results for the level 2 banks. Panel A Column (2) reports regression results for all level 3 banks. Panel A 
Column (3) reports results for the subsample of level 3 banks that adopt lower of costs or market reporting 
for their MSR assets. Panel A Column (4) reports regression results for the subsample of level 3 banks that 
are matched with level 2 banks on the lower of costs or market accounting choice and geographic location. 
Panel A Column (5) reports regression results for the subsample of level 3 banks that are matched with 
level 2 banks on the lower of costs or market accounting choice, the state-level house price index, and size. 
	  
***, **, * indicate significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Two-tailed p-values are reported in 
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. 
	  
MSR is the fair value of mortgage servicing right scaled by the beginning balance of total assets. 
Servicing Fee  is the servicing fee generated from the servicing assets scaled by beginning total assets. 
FORE_RISK  is the percentage of residential mortgage serviced for others that are in process of 
foreclosure, measured for each bank quarter. Size  is the natural log of total assets. REFI_RISK  is the 
state-level refinancing rate, which is measured for each state-year as the amount of loans approved for 
refinancing purpose divided by total amount of loans approved. 
